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THE CURRENT AND FUTURE STATE OF
GUN POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
WILLIAM J. VIZZARD*
In spite of years of journalistic and public attention and debate, the
United States has instituted few changes in firearms policy over the past
century. Opposition diluted a brief push by the Roosevelt administration in
the 1930s and resulted in two minimalist federal statutes. A second effort in
the wake of the assassinations of John and Robert Kennedy and Martin
Luther King produced the Gun Control Act of 1968, which largely remains
the primary federal law. Even this modest control effort was subsequently
diluted by the Firearms Owners Protection Act of 1986. The Clinton
administration managed to pass the Brady Act, requiring background
checks on purchases from licensed firearms dealers, and a law directed at
“assault weapons,” which sunset after ten years. For the past two decades,
policy activity has shifted to the state legislatures and the courts, where
concealed carry laws have flourished and the Second Amendment has been
recognized as an individual and fundamental right.
Entrenched opposition in Congress and state legislatures, declining
public support, well-organized institutional opposition, and constitutional
constraints have limited policy options for the foreseeable future. Given
these constraints, advocates should focus on limited, pragmatic goals that
include reducing gun possession and carrying by high-risk individuals,
restricting access to firearms by prohibited persons, and utilizing firearms
laws to incapacitate violent, career offenders.

* Professor Emeritus of Criminal Justice at California State University Sacramento.
Prior to entering academia, Dr. Vizzard spent twenty-seven years as a special agent,
supervisor, and manager in the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. He is the author
of SHOTS IN THE DARK: THE POLICY, POLITICS AND SYMBOLISM OF GUN CONTROL; IN THE
CROSSFIRE: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIREARMS;
and numerous articles on firearm policy. Much of the information contained in this Article
is based on Dr. Vizzard’s extensive experience.
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I. A HISTORY OF EPISODIC POLITICAL FOCUS
Firearms policy in the United States has periodically entered the policy
agenda for almost a century. Although federal legislation enacted in 1968
appeared to foretell a shift away from a laissez-faire approach to policy on
firearms, the following half-century has seen a sharp increase in the power
of gun control opponents, a rollback of regulations, and the emergence of an
individual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment. Future
restrictions seem unlikely in the face of constitutional and political
constraints, but some modest proposals may prove possible.
A. FEDERAL

At the national level, gun control policy has remained essentially
unchanged for the past twenty years. Following the 1993 passage of both
the Brady Handgun Prevention Act (commonly termed the Brady Law) and
federal assault weapon restrictions, the 1994 Republican congressional
victories marked the end of any momentum for additional federal
legislation.1 Since then, the federal assault weapon legislation, which
appears to have had little impact,2 has sunset, and Congress has imposed
1

ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 147–54 (2012).
CHRISTOPHER S. KOPER, UNIV. OF PA. JERRY LEE CTR. OF CRIMINOLOGY, AN UPDATED
ASSESSMENT OF THE FEDERAL ASSAULT WEAPONS BAN: IMPACTS ON GUN MARKETS AND GUN
VIOLENCE, 1994–2003 (June 2004), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/
204431.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5STF-W9PC (noting that, though there was a
noticeable drop in use of assault weapons during the commission of crimes, “the
decline . . . was offset throughout at least the late 1990s by steady or rising use of other guns
equipped with [large capacity magazines],” but concluding that it was “premature to make
definitive assessments of the ban’s impact on gun crime.”).
2
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restrictions on the use of gun tracing results.3 Neither of these actions
constituted a significant shift in the fundamental national policy relating to
firearm possession and commerce.
Despite the mass shootings at Columbine High School in Littleton,
Colorado; Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, Virginia; a movie theater in
Aurora, Colorado; Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown,
Connecticut; and the attempted assassination of U.S. Representative
Gabrielle Giffords and accompanying mass shooting in Tucson, Arizona, no
gun control legislation has passed either house of Congress since the
sunsetting of the assault weapons ban.4 On the other hand, state legislatures
have been far more active, primarily in liberalizing concealed carry laws.5
However, in the aftermath of the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting,
a few states have moved to place additional restrictions on magazine
capacity of semiautomatic firearms.6
In fact, the history of firearms regulation in the United States over the
past century reflects a consistent pattern. The early 1900s saw a number of
states move to restrict handguns in various ways, followed by many of
those states retreating from those restrictions.7 This was followed by a
period of quiescence, when neither the states nor the federal government
took action. The 1930s marked the next period of activity. In 1934, the
National Firearms Act (NFA) was passed; the Federal Firearms Act (FFA)
followed in 1938.8 This period also demonstrated another recurring pattern.
The original proposals for the NFA would have incorporated both handguns
and what are currently referred to in common usage as assault rifles into the
law’s licensing and tax requirements.9 However, the proposed legislation
3
James V. Grimaldi & Sari Horwitz, After Gun Industry Pressure, Veil Was Draped
over Tracing Data, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2010, at A11.
4
Jennifer Steinhauer, Despite Tearful Pleas, No Real Chance, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,
2013, at A1. See generally PHILIP J. COOK & KRISTIN A. GOSS, THE GUN DEBATE: WHAT
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 105–06 tbl.6.2 (2014).
5
Alan Berlow, Concealed Carry, POLITICO (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2013/12/gun-law-concealed-carry-permit-utah-101113.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/HXM6-86UR.
As Berlow discusses, only California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island
retain discretionary permit laws as of 2013. Id.
6
See Karen Yourish & Larry Buchanan, State Gun Laws Enacted in the Year Since
Newtown, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2013, at A20.
7
See WILLIAM J. VIZZARD, SHOTS IN THE DARK: THE POLICY, POLITICS AND SYMBOLISM
OF GUN CONTROL 87–88 (2000).
8
Id. at 89–91.
9
“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That for the purposes of this act the term ‘firearm’ means a
pistol, revolver, shotgun having a barrel less than sixteen inches in length, or any other
firearm capable of being concealed on the person, a muffler or silencer therefor, or a
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was quickly amended to include only machine guns, sawed-off rifles and
shotguns, silencers, and a few other odd firearms.10
Subsequently, public and legislative attention turned away from the
issue of firearms regulation. It would take a presidential assassination to
rekindle it.11 Although Senator Dodd had introduced a bill to restrict mail
order sales of handguns prior to the assassination, the bill had not moved.
Following the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Dodd amended
the bill to cover all firearms and began a series of hearings.12 Between 1963
and 1968, a combination of rising crime rates, administration support, and
the murders of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy finally
generated enough antigun political support to push the Gun Control Act of
1968 (GCA) through Congress.13 The GCA, with subsequent amendments,
remains the primary federal statute governing the possession of, and
commerce in, firearms.14
Although a number of unsuccessful bills expanding control of firearms
were introduced during the 1970s, and some symbolic legislation relating to
so-called “cop killer bullets” and “plastic guns” became law,15 no
significant new legislation passed Congress for almost two decades after the
passage of the GCA.16 During that time, organized opposition to firearms
regulation intensified.17 When new federal legislation was enacted in 1986,
it reflected both the conservative political turn of U.S. politics and the
increased organization and intensity of the pro-gun lobby.18
The Firearms Owners Protection Act (FOPA) significantly modified
the GCA in several ways. Among the most significant changes were
reducing a licensed dealer’s record, reducing record falsification and failure
to record from felonies to misdemeanors, and redefining engaging in the

machine gun. The term ‘machine gun’ means any weapon designed to shoot automatically
or semiautomatically twelve or more shots without reloading.” H.R. 9066, 73d Cong. (1934)
(enacted).
10
26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (1934); Carol Skalnik Leff & Mark H. Leff, The Politics of
Ineffectiveness: Federal Firearms Legislation, 455 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 48,
60–61 (1981).
11
VIZZARD, supra note 7.
12
Id. at 93–94.
13
Id. at 93–105.
14
18 U.S.C. §§ 921–931 (2012); 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5861, §§ 5971-5872 (2012). See
William J. Vizzard, The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 79 (1999),
for a broader discussion of the GCA.
15
VIZZARD, supra note 7, at 129–32.
16
See COOK & GOSS, supra note 4, 105–06 tbl.6.2.
17
VIZZARD, supra note 7, at 59–72.
18
Id.
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business of dealing in firearms.19 The new definition required proof of
conducting a “regular course of trade or business with the principal
objective of livelihood and profit through the repetitive purchase and resale
of firearms.”20 In addition, the change specifically exempted anyone
making “occasional sales, exchanges, or purchases of firearms for the
enhancement of a personal collection or for a hobby, or who sells all or part
of his personal collection of firearms.”21 The federal government was
specifically prohibited from implementing regulations to require reporting
of gun purchases or to create a gun registration system, and inspections of
dealers were limited to one per year.22
With one significant addition, the GCA, as revised by the FOPA,
remains the primary federal law regulating commerce in and possession of
firearms. That addition, the Brady Law, requiring a waiting period and
criminal records check before a dealer may deliver a handgun to a
purchaser, passed both houses of Congress and was signed by President
Clinton in 1993.23 An amendment to the bill inserted a sunset clause on the
waiting period and mandated its replacement by an instant check system for
all firearms sales by licensees within five years.24 Although a federal ban
on certain firearms defined as assault weapons and on the future production
of firearm magazines with a capacity exceeding ten rounds was enacted the
following year, the law contained a ten-year sunset clause. Congress failed
to renew the assault weapons ban in 2004, allowing it to expire.25
Thus, federal policy relating to firearms possession and commerce has
experienced only three notable changes in the past seventy-five years.
Since the 1968 enactment of the GCA, one of these policy changes, FOPA,
has significantly weakened gun policy. Although the issue has recurrently
intruded on the public policy agenda, received significant media attention,
and stirred passions, particularly among opponents of control, Congress has
not acted on any significant legislation for two decades.26 Given that a
Democratic Senate failed to pass any legislation in the aftermath of the
Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting,27 it appears unlikely that
legislation of any substance will emerge from Congress any time soon.
19

18 U.S.C. § 921 (2012).
18 U.S.C. § 921(A)(21)(c) (2012).
21
Id.
22
18 U.S.C. §§ 923(g)(1)(B)(ii)(I), 923(g)(1)(C)(i) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 926(a) (2012).
23
18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1) (2012).
24
Id. § 922(s).
25
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Effort to Renew Weapons Ban Falters on Hill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
9, 2004, at A1; see also SPITZER, supra note 1, at147 .
26
COOK & GOSS, supra note 4, at 105–06 tbl.6.2.
27
Ed O’Keefe, Gun Background Check Compromise, Assault Weapon Ban Fail in
20
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B. STATE AND LOCAL

Far more activity has occurred at the state and local level. In 1976,
Washington, D.C. enacted the strictest handgun law in the country,
essentially banning the private ownership of handguns and imposing
restrictions on the possession and storage of long guns.28 Although some
anticipated that this would be the initial act in a series of strict state laws
applying to handguns, this did not prove to be the case. A 1976
Massachusetts initiative, Question 5, which would have outlawed private
ownership of handguns, was defeated.29
The subsequent defeat of
Proposition 15, a measure to freeze the existing California handgun
population, in 1982, clearly signaled that the D.C. law did not foretell a new
wave of gun restrictions.30 Although a few states added some minor
restrictions during the next thirty years, the primary trend in state law was
one of liberalizing restrictions on the concealed carrying of firearms.
Until the latter part of the twentieth century, most states either
prohibited carrying a concealed firearm on the person away from one’s
home or business or required a permit to do so.31 Typically, the permits
were issued by local sheriffs or police chiefs, who had the discretion to
deny or issue a permit based upon their judgment.32 A few exceptions
existed. Vermont, for example, had no laws relating to concealed or open
carry.33 On the opposite pole, Wisconsin had no provision for issuing a
permit.34 In 1961, the state of Washington revised its statute to guarantee
all applicants, except those prohibited by law from possessing a firearm

Senate, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/postpolitics/wp/2013/04/17/senate-to-vote-on-amendments-to-gun-bill-with-background-checkplan-in-doubt/, archived at http://perma.cc/3W9U-F5BS.
28
See Meg Smith & Leah Carliner, A History of the DC Gun Ban, WASH. POST (June 26,
2008, 10:30 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/17/
AR2007071700689.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5R5K-HX4G.
29
SEC’Y OF COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, STATEWIDE BALLOT QUESTIONS—
STATISTICS BY YEAR: 1919–2012, available at www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/elebalm/
balmresults.html#year1976, archived at http://perma.cc/6KD8-P22V.
30
The law would have required registration of all handguns in the state at time of
passage, but prohibited private individuals from acquiring new ones. See VIZZARD, supra
note 7, at 128.
31
See JAMES B. JACOBS, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK? 34 (2002).
32
JEFFREY R. SNYDER, CATO INST., FIGHTING BACK: CRIME, SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE
RIGHT TO CARRY A HANDGUN 4 (Oct. 22, 1997), available at http://object.cato.org/sites/
cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa284.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/BM5H-U3B5.
33
See id. at 28 n.1.
34
See Patrick Marley & Bill Glauber, Wisconsin Senate Passes Concealed-Carry Bill,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (June 14, 2011), available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/
statepolitics/123826279.html#ixzz2wFg9PORF, archived at http://perma.cc/T7HH-6C8U.
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such as violent felons, the right to a permit.35 The change in the law
apparently attracted little national attention. However, when Florida passed
a similar liberalization in 1987, the new policy attracted nationwide
attention and initiated a national trend.36 The move to so-called “shall
issue” states accelerated rapidly during the 1990s.37 By November 2013,
only nine states retained discretion for the issuance of permits, and several
states had either eliminated the requirement for a permit or were in the
process of doing so.38 Although efforts by gun rights advocates to pass a
state reciprocity requirement relating to concealed carry permits have failed
to gain congressional approval, thirty-five states currently recognize out-ofstate permits and several issue permits to nonresidents.39 Overlapping the
movement to mandatory issuance of concealed carry permits is the
“constitutional carry” movement, which seeks to eliminate any requirement
of a permit.40
As a result of the 2010 midterm elections, the rise of the Tea Party,
and the subsequent reapportionment of state legislative districts,41 the
balance of power in a number of state legislatures significantly shifted to
conservatives opposed to firearms regulation and federal authority.42 The
magnitude of the shift can be seen in the effort by some state legislatures to
pass legislation that nullifies all federal gun laws and criminalizes their
enforcement.43 Given the fact that reapportionment will not occur until
2020, it is unlikely that the power balance of state legislatures will change
appreciably enough to favor firearms control legislation before then.44 At

35

VIZZARD, supra note 7, at 145.
Id. at 37.
37
See id.
38
Berlow, supra note 5. California, Hawaii, New York, New Jersey, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Delaware retain discretionary permit laws.
See NAT’L RIFLE ASSOC.-INST. FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION, STATE LAWS, http://www.
nraila.org/gun-laws/state-laws.aspx (last visited June 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/
7BW7-BWCF.
39
Berlow, supra note 5.
40
Jonathan Ellis, 12 States on Path to Guns with No Permits, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 2012,
at 3A; Charles C.W. Cooke, AR to Become ‘Constitutional Carry’ State, NAT’L R. ONLINE
(July 2, 2013, 12:19 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/352575/ar-becomeconstitutional-carry-state-charles-c-w-cooke#, archived at http://perma.cc/74TM-5QGH.
41
Steven Shepard, Democrats Still Paying the Price for 2010 Losses, NAT'L J. (Jan. 21,
2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/democrats-still-paying-the-price-for-2010losses-20140121, archived at http://perma.cc/WLG5-XRZX.
42
See Sam Wang, The Great Gerrymander of 2012, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2013, at SR1.
43
Steve Chapman, Nullifying Gun Laws, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 18, 2013, at 23.
44
See Bob Benenson, In Remapping, No Guarantees, CONGRESS.ORG (Mar. 7, 2011),
https://ssl.congress.org/news/2011/03/11/in_remapping_no_guarantees, archived at http://
perma.cc/6RFA-QYJT; Alex Roarty, Where the Biggest Wave Hit, NAT’L J., Nov. 6, 2010, at
36
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the other end of the spectrum, a few states have enacted more restrictive
legislation.45
However, these initiatives were limited to additional
restrictions on paramilitary firearms, limits on magazine capacity, and
records checks for private buyers, all policies that already existed in some
states. In Colorado, new laws mandating record checks for all gun buyers
and limiting firearm magazines to fifteen rounds resulted in the recall of
two members of the state legislature.46 Although predicting changes in the
political winds is a risky activity, it appears unlikely that the majority of
states will institute laws significantly changing the direction of firearms
policy.
C. THE COURTS

While Congress has taken no significant action since the passage of the
Brady Law, the Supreme Court has taken monumental action. Although
impact on day-to-day policy has thus far primarily affected only
Washington, D.C. and Illinois, the potential extent of these two court
decisions is far-reaching. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court
invalidated the District of Columbia’s virtual ban on handgun possession
and held that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to
possess firearms.47 In McDonald v. Chicago, the Court extended the
potential restraint on legislation to the states by finding that it was a
fundamental right and thereby incorporated the Second Amendment under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.48
The McDonald case may prove the more important decision for gun
policy in the long run. Given the history of gun regulation, a highly
restrictive federal statute always seemed an unlikely event. However, both
Chicago and the District of Columbia had already demonstrated the
capacity of local governments to move toward virtual prohibition of
handguns, and the possibility of some states following suit does not seem
beyond the realm of possibility.
In addition to blocking any future move toward handgun prohibition,
these two decisions have virtually assured a continuing series of future legal
actions to challenge existing controls at all levels, which have already
10.
45

See, e.g., Ian Lovett, In California, New Package of Gun Laws but One Snag, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2013, at A11; see also Peter Applebome & Ray Rivera, In Connecticut, Gun
Curbs Had Difficult Path, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2013, at A1.
46
Katie Glueck, Colorado Lawmakers Recalled over Guns, POLITICO (Sept. 10, 2013,
2:51 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/colorado-recall-guns-referendum-96566.
html#ixzz2kfDAGwUm, archived at http://perma.cc/ALD4-SBWL.
47
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 622, 635 (2008).
48
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010).
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begun.49 Heller and McDonald did not occur by accident. They were the
result of a long, committed, and well-funded effort in pursuit of these goals
by those who view gun rights as fundamental.50 Although the outcome of
future litigation remains uncertain, the institutional forces that precipitated
these decisions will not evaporate any more than did advocates of racial
equality after Brown v. Board of Education. Just as racial integration
preceded a push for school busing and affirmative action, actions to further
reduce existing gun controls will follow Heller and McDonald.
II. PUBLIC OPINION AND INTEREST GROUP SUPPORT
Although surveys reflected an increase in nationwide support for
requiring record checks on private gun sales in the wake of the Sandy Hook
shooting, the support quickly declined.51 The long-term trend for over
twenty years has been a decline in public support for more regulation.52 In
fact, the attention devoted to firearms regulation appears to have
significantly increased firearms sales in the short run.53
An examination of book sales, letters to the editor, and blog
commentaries all support the conclusion that gun control opponents are far
more intensely and consistently engaged than gun control advocates. This
is further supported historically by the preponderance of letters opposing
gun control received by legislators.54
49
See Maura Dolan, Concealed Gun Law Overturned, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 14, 2014,
at A3; Adam Liptak, Justices Refuse Case on New York Gun Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16,
2013, at A13; Ann E. Marimow & Aaron C. Davis, Md. Gun Law Gets Court’s Backing,
WASH. POST., Mar. 22, 2013, at B01; Jessica Gresko, DC Again Asks Judge to Uphold Gun
Laws, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 5, 2013, 5:25 PM), http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/
local/DC-Again-Asks-Judge-to-Uphold-Gun-Laws-230704001.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/R7VG-T7WY.
50
VIZZARD, supra note 7, at 53–54, 64.
51
See Rebecca Ballhaus, Poll: Support for Tighter Gun Checks Ebbs, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
13, 2013, 10:35 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/12/13/poll-support-for-tightergun-checks-softens/, archived at http://perma.cc/8JW6-2TNG.
52
See Lydia Saad, U.S. Remains Divided over Passing Stricter Gun Laws, GALLUP (Oct.
2 5 , 2 0 1 3 ) , h t t p : / / w w w . g a l l u p . c o m/ p o l l / 1 6 5 5 6 3 / r e m a i n s - d i vi d e d - p a s s i n g stricter-gun-laws.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/APU5-8B85.
53
See Bruce Kennedy, Will 2013 Mark Record Gun Sales in US?, MSN MONEY (July
19, 2013, 4:47 PM), http://money.msn.com/now/post--will-2013-mark-record-gun-sales-inus, archived at http://perma.cc/9L5T-MJXA; Ben Rooney, Ruger CEO: Gun Sales
Returning to Normal Levels, CNNMONEY (Aug. 1, 2013, 4:16 PM), http://money.cnn.com/
2013/08/01/investing/sturm-ruger-gun-sales/, archived at http://perma.cc/WM8L-3E3F.
54
Although accurate book sales figures are not publicly available, Amazon.com rankings
provide a useful proxy. This author has followed the gun issue for over forty years in a
number of major newspapers and on numerous blogs, interviewed a number of federal and
state legislative staff members, and worked in the ATF’s headquarters. The preponderance
of opposition communication was apparent in all instances. See also Sam Stein & Paul
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The decline in public support for gun control likely results from a
variety of forces. First, public support for and trust in government has
declined markedly since the 1960s.55 Second, as Benjamin Barber has
argued, all American political narratives are rights-based.56 The existence
of the Second Amendment and a persistent effort by opponents of gun
control to shape the argument as one of individual rights has produced these
results.
In addition, the gun rights advocacy infrastructure far exceeds the
meager gun control advocacy infrastructure.
Those opposing gun
regulation have two distinct advantages. Gun enthusiasts can organize
around specific institutions and events such as gun stores, gun shows,
shooting ranges, and shooting activities. A thriving gun press activates and
links supporters, and numerous organizations built around shooting and gun
interests provide structure for organizing.57 Moreover, gun control
advocates lack any such specific organizational advantages and most do not
rank gun control as their primary issue.58
However, the successes of gun control opponents may hold the seeds
for their future problems. Subsequent to the highly publicized Trayvon
Martin homicide, Florida experienced at least two more high-profile
incidents of minor confrontations escalating to the shooting death of
unarmed persons.59 It remains to be seen how such incidents, involving

Blumenthal, The Gun Lobby: Why the NRA Is the Baddest Force in Politics, HUFFINGTON
POST (Dec 17, 2012, 6:39 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/17/gun-lobbynra_n_2317885.html, archived at http://perma.cc/UV6K-NMA8; How the NRA Relies More
on Grassroots Mobilization Rather than Lobbying, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
TUMBLELOG (Dec. 18, 2012, 10:47 AM), http://usnews.tumblr.com/post/38229308383/howthe-nra-relies-more-on-grassroots-mobilization#.UyoLD86a-So, archived at http://perma.cc/
5FT5-H82X.
55
See Trust in Government, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/5392/trustgovernment.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/BRK7-WC2Q.
56
See BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 14–16 (1984).
57
See Walter Hickey, How the NRA Became the Most Powerful Special Interest in
Washington, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 18, 2012, 1:43 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/nralobbying-money-national-rifle-association-washington-2012-12#ixzz2ppzW3JqN, archived
at http://perma.cc/63UX-W2TW.
58
See Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Fewer Mention Economic Issues as Top Problem,
GALLUP (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/161342/fewer-mention-economicissues-top-problem.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/Z926-77YQ; Gun Control: Key Data
Points from Pew Research, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (July 27, 2013), http://www.
pewresearch.org/key-data-points/gun-control-key-data-points-from-pew-research/, archived
at http://perma.cc/LJC8-4G6S.
59
See Alan Blinder, Trial Brings New Scrutiny of Self-Defense Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
7, 2014, at A11; Frances Robles, Retired Police Captain Feared Attack Before Shooting in
Theater, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2014, at A15.
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apparently law-abiding citizens who are lawfully carrying concealed
handguns, will shape future public opinion.
A. THE CRIME NARRATIVE

In addition to the structural and cultural impediments to sustaining
support for gun control, the writings of John Lott, Gary Kleck, and others
have generated a new narrative that has undercut the perceived association
between guns and violent crime. The narrative began with Kleck’s
argument for the crime deterring effects of guns through defensive gun use
(DGU).60 Kleck, and later Kleck and Gertz, have argued that firearms are
used as many as 2.5 million times per year to defend against crime.61 They
base their conclusions on random telephone surveys that ask about the
defensive use of guns.62 Alternatively, the Bureau of Justice Statistics’
National Crime Victims Survey (NCVS) produces an estimate closer to
70,000.63
Both surveys were conducted by legitimate researchers, albeit using
different methodology.64 The surveys used by Kleck initially asked directly
about gun use to thwart crimes,65 while the NCVS questionnaire first asked
if the respondent was the victim of a crime or attempted crime, followed by
questions regarding what actions were taken to resist that crime.66 Kleck
argues that the very low reporting rate to the NCVS results from fear of
admitting gun use to a government agency.67 Yet when one examines the
other responses to these high-rate surveys, serious questions arise. Thirty
percent of the respondents report that they probably or almost certainly
saved a life through gun use. This would translate into about 600,000 lives
saved per year or 300 times the total reported murders in the United States.
Likewise, the number of persons reported wounded by the respondents does
not match possible reality.68
60

VIZZARD, supra note 7, at 15.
Gary Kleck & Mark Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of
Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 164 (1995).
62
Id. at 160.
63
See id. at 153.
64
For NCVS methodology, see Data Collection: National Crime Victimization Survey
(NCVS), BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&
iid=245#Methodology (last visited June 21, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/YXQ8WXTS. For the basic NCVS questionnaire, see NCVS 2 Incident Report, available at http://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ncvs2_2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/N2UW-FJ5U.
65
See Kleck & Gertz, supra note 61, at 160–63.
66
See NCVS 2 Incident Report, supra note 64.
67
Gary Kleck & Mark Gertz, Illegitimacy of One-Sided Speculation: Getting the
Defensive Gun Use Estimate Down, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1446, 1446 (1997).
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See VIZZARD, supra note 7, at 15–19.
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The likely answer is that a small number of respondents are
exaggerating or lying. Since only 1% of respondents, in the high-rate
studies, report DGU, only a small percentage of false positives will result in
very high estimates.69 Yet a critique of the methods and internal
contradictions within the data offers a far less effective political argument
than the claim that research proves guns prevent crimes.
Even more than the DGU argument, the writing of economist John
Lott has had wide circulation. Lott’s More Guns, Less Crime, now in its
fourth edition, has been sold widely and is still routinely quoted by control
opponents in letters, in blogs, and in editorials. Lott applied regression
analysis to county level data and concluded that violent crime rates declined
as the issuance of concealed carry licenses increased, which he attributes to
deterrent effect.70 Lott continues to depend primarily upon his original
analysis, which utilized crime figures from the late 1980s and early 1990s.71
A number of scholars have critiqued Lott’s methodology, yet few members
of the public have the background to evaluate econometric, quantitative
models.72
However, a natural experiment exists as a result of differing laws in
the four most populous states. California and New York have discretionary
concealed permit issuance laws and low numbers of such permits.73 Texas
and Florida both mandate issuance to all applicants not prohibited from
possessing firearms, such as felons and minors.74 A comparison of violent
crime and Part One crime rate changes in these states from the date of
inception of the “shall issue” law to 2012 reveals that, in seven of the eight
comparisons, the states with fewer permits have had greater decreases in
69

See id.
See JOHN LOTT, MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME (2010) (utilizing regression analysis to argue
that the issuance of concealed carry licenses have increased as violent crime rates have
declined).
71
Id. at 37–99. The time period for the data is significant, as this marked the beginning
of a rapid nationwide drop in crime that continued through 2012.
72
See Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the ‘More Guns, Less Crime’
Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202 (2003); William Alan Bartley & Mark A. Cohen,
The Effect of Concealed Weapons Laws: An Extreme Bound Analysis, 36 ECON. INQUIRY
258, 258 (1998); Dan A. Black & Daniel S. Nagin, Do Right-to-Carry Laws Deter Violent
Crime?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 219 (1998); John J. Donohue III, The Final Bullet in the
Body of the More Guns, Less Crime Hypothesis, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 397, 397–99
(2003); Mark Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, 5 J. POL. ECON. 1086, 1088 (2001); Steven
D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the
Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 175 (2004); Tomislav V. Kovandzic &
Thomas B. Marvell, Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns and Violent Crime: Crime Control
Through Gun Decontrol?, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 363, 368–74 (2003).
73
See NAT’L RIFLE ASSOC.-INST. FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION, supra note 38.
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Id.
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crime.75 Given the extended period that permissive carry laws have been in
effect in Florida and Texas, and the very large and diverse populations of all
four states, these figures should raise questions for anyone looking at Lott’s
thesis. Nevertheless, Lott’s work has been widely read and his thesis is
routinely invoked, even by legislators.76 And the undeniable fact is that
violent crime rates, and crime rates in general, declined between 1992 and
2012 in spite of the ever-increasing number of firearms in American
society.77 Although this rough correlation does not constitute evidence that
firearms reduce crime, it serves to undercut previous arguments that firearm
availability constituted the primary driver of earlier increases in violent
crime rates.

75

Calculation by author using FBI Uniform Crime Reports. Part One crimes as defined
by the FBI are criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary,
larceny/theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. The author made the following comparisons
between violent crime rates and Part One crime rates: From 1995 to 2011: California to New
York to Texas; from 1987 to 2011, California to New York to Florida. FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UCR DATA ONLINE, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/
index.cfm (last visited August 27, 2014) (For the 1995 to 2011 comparison, follow “Go to
the table-building tool” hyperlink, then follow “All States and U.S. Total,” then follow “One
year of data.” In Column A, query “California, New York, Texas.” In Column B, query
“violent property rates” and “property crime rates.” In Column C, query “1995.” For
“violent crime rate,” the values returned for California, New York and Texas should
respectively be, when rounded to whole numbers, 966, 842, and 664. To compute Part I
crimes for each state, add the “violent crime rate” to the “property crime rate.” The values
returned for California, New York, and Texas should respectively be, when rounded to
whole numbers, 4,865, 4,560, and 5,684. Repeat this procedure for the year 2011 by
switching the query in Column C to “2011.” For “violent crime rate,” the values returned for
California, New York and Texas should respectively be, when rounded to whole numbers,
411, 398, 408. For Part I crimes, the values should respectively be 2,995, 2,311, and 3,880.
To compute the decline from 1995 to 2011 for all states, for example, take the 1995 “violent
crime rate” for California (966), subtract by the 2011 “violent crime rate” for California
(411) and divide by the 1995 “violent crime rate” to get a 57% rate of decline. When
repeating this calculation for New York and Texas, the decline rates for violent crimes are
respectively 53% and 38%. When performing this calculation for “Part I” crimes, the
decline rates for California, New York and Texas are respectively 38%, 49%, and 32%.
Repeat the initial query for the 1987 to 2011 comparison for California, New York and
Florida. When following these same steps, the calculations for the decline in “violent crime
rates” are respectively 55%, 59%, and 49%. The calculations for the decline in “Part I crime
rates” are respectively 54%, 61%, and 59%.
76
See Alex Seitz-Wald, Why Is the Media Rehabilitating John Lott?, SALON.COM (Dec.
21, 2012, 7:57 AM), http://www.salon.com/2012/12/21/why_is_the_media_rehabilitating_
john_lott/, archived at http://perma.cc/8LB7-BA3S; Sean Sullivan, GOP Rep. Gohmert:
More Access to Guns Could Avert Mass Shootings, WASH. POST. (Dec. 16, 2012, 11:47
AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2012/12/16/gop-rep-gohmert-moreaccess-to-guns-could-avert-mass-shootings/, archived at http://perma.cc/H7J8-VHE7.
77
Both the Uniform Crime Report and the National Crime Victim Survey support the
conclusion that crime dropped significantly between the early 1990s and 2012.

892

VIZZARD

[Vol. 104

III. POLICY
A. LIMITED POLICY OPTIONS

Future policy options are constrained by politics, law, and facts on the
ground. In Heller, the Court made it clear that prohibitions on possession
by some classes of persons are constitutional.78 Thus, laws restricting
felons, minors, and those who are adjudicated mentally ill seem unlikely to
be in danger. Likewise, any attempt at prohibition or quasi-prohibition of
firearms not currently prohibited would appear to fail the constitutional
standard.79 Thus, future fights will likely focus on concealed and open
carry laws, licensing, and registration. In addition, the courts will almost
assuredly have to face the issue of restrictions on military-style firearms.
Assuming the courts do not overturn current restrictions on machine guns
and destructive devices, a fairly safe assumption, the fight will focus on
permit systems and semiautomatic, military-style rifles, often referred to as
assault weapons.
Even within the confines of what is allowed under the current
interpretation of the Second Amendment, efforts at any additional federal
regulation face several hurdles. The first is the current strength of
conservative political forces and the opposition to gun control among
members of the Republican Party and other conservatives.80 The power of
such opposition is intensified by the bicameral nature of Congress and the
Republican structural advantage at the state and federal level, resulting from
2010 redistricting and a lack of active public support for gun control.81
In addition to limits set by the Second Amendment, the Tenth
Amendment also constitutes a constraint on federal options. In Printz v.
United States, the Court ruled that the Tenth Amendment barred the federal
government from requiring state and local law enforcement to conduct
record checks of gun buyers.82 Previously, the Court had ruled in United
States v. Lopez that Congress had exceeded its Commerce Clause powers
by restricting guns on or near school grounds.83 Although these decisions
do not apply exclusively to firearms controls, they do set limits on
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District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–28 (2008).
Although Heller left numerous questions as to the exact nature of the constitutional
standard, the decision made clear that prohibition of commonly possessed firearms did not
meet that standard. Id. at 624–25.
80
See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 58.
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Even when a majority supports a specific control, activity and intensity favor the
opposition.
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Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933–34 (1997).
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United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
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congressional authority to devise regulation strategies that mandate any
state or local action.
Finally, the sheer size of the gun-owning population and its wide
distribution throughout the populace presents significant problems in
crafting any uniform national regulation. Although it is impossible to
exactly calculate the number of firearms in the country, the number likely
exceeds 300 million.84 Although existing barriers seem to preclude policy
change, eventually all public policy is subject to change. A hundred years
of Jim Crow laws and “separate but equal” jurisprudence imploded in the
second half of the twentieth century. The New Deal coalition and the
expansion of the welfare state looked inevitable in 1964, but not in 1968.
In the case of gun control, demographics seem to portend the potential for
future change. Notwithstanding the surge in gun sales that occurred in
reaction to proposed changes in federal law following the Sandy Hook
shooting, the long-term trend in gun ownership and in hunting is
downward.85 In an ever more urbanized nation, in which fewer young
people develop interest in and attachment to guns and shooting sports, the
political balance will inevitably shift over time. This trend will likely be
amplified by the increasing electoral influence of women and minorities,
who reflect less special interest support for gun rights and generally support
more liberal candidates.86
B. OBJECTIVES FOR FUTURE POLICY

Rational policy formulation argues for useful and attainable goals.
Too often, advocates have pursued regulation for its own sake. Three
potential goals stand out as having these useful and attainable
characteristics:
(1) Reduce gun possession and carrying by high-risk individuals.
(2) Reduce access to firearms by prohibited persons.
(3) Utilize firearms laws to incapacitate violent, career offenders.

84
William J. Vizzard, Firearms Industry, in GUNS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND LAW 290 (Gregg Lee Carter ed., 2nd
ed. 2013).
85
Id. at 289–90.
86
See Ronald Brownstein, Stark Divide Between Blacks, Whites on Gun Control and
Health Care, NAT'L J. (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/congressionalconnection/coverage/stark-divide-between-blacks-whites-on-gun-control-and-health-care20130926, archived at http://perma.cc/FS5B-BQN7; Taegan Goddard, Why New Gun
Controls Are Inevitable, THE WEEK (Jan 15 2013, 9:17 AM), http://theweek.com/article/
index/238772/why-new-gun-controls-are-inevitable, archived at http://perma.cc/9V3PPCUX.
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Access to firearms facilitates robbery, serious assault, and homicide.
An examination of the circumstances of stranger homicides reveals a
common pattern of young males, often under twenty-one years of age or
with prior felony convictions, acting with little to no prior planning in
response to challenge or conflict.87 Routine activity theory postulates crime
occurs when a motivated offender encounters an available victim in the
absence of a capable guardian.88 An offender must be capable as well as
motivated. Reducing the immediate availability of a firearm by making
acquisition more difficult and possession more risky directly attacks that
capability.
The available evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that
prohibited persons acquire guns most often from acquaintances or the
secondary market.89 Offenders and traffickers have a continuing need to
replenish their supply of firearms from the primary market.90 Policy should
focus on increasing risk for transfer of firearms to prohibited persons,
stemming the flow of new firearms from the primary or legal market to the
secondary or unlicensed market, and reducing or eliminating trafficking in
this secondary market. Unlicensed traffickers lack both the motivation and
capacity to determine the eligibility of a purchaser to lawfully receive the
firearm and typically sell to all potential buyers.91
Although regulating the secondary market primarily faces opposition
from conservatives and the gun lobby, the third objective generates
opposition from liberals. Because the U.S. criminal justice system has
overutilized incarceration as a response to crime, any proposal advancing
the use of incarceration as a crime prevention mechanism faces immediate
suspicion and opposition from liberals, particularly criminologists.92 While
87
The author has observed homicide events for fifty years. They routinely result from a
perceived slight or challenge that escalates, or from gang members detecting a violation of
their turf. See also RICHARD T. WRIGHT & SCOTT H. DECKER, ARMED ROBBERS IN ACTION
(1997). The authors’ interviews of armed robbers document the tendency for spontaneous,
risky behavior that is facilitated by the presence of a firearm. For characteristics of homicide
events, see Evelyn M. Kuhn, et al., Victim and Perpetrator Characteristics for FirearmRelated Homicides of Youth During 1991–1997, in THE VARIETIES OF HOMICIDE AND ITS
RESEARCH: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1999 MEETING OF THE HOMICIDE RESEARCH WORKING
GROUP 111, 111 (Paul H. Blackman et al., eds.), available at http://umaine.edu/socialwork/
files/2014/02/femicide.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/K7CA-7N93.
88
See Nicholas Branic, Routine Activities Theory, ENCYCLOPEDIA CRIME & PUNISHMENT
(forthcoming 2014).
89
See VIZZARD, supra note 7, at 29–31.
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Phillip J. Cook, et al., Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59,
63–64, 68–71 (1995). See also William J. Vizzard, A Systematic Approach to Controlling
Firearms Markets, 11 J. ON FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 177, 179 (1999).
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these constitute valid concerns, they should not automatically preclude
consideration of targeted use of incarceration. Available research, as well
as my own experience, support the conclusion that a subset of about 20% of
active offenders routinely possesses and uses firearms.93 The same research
seems to support the conclusion that this group commits all crime at a rate
higher than the average incarcerated offender and commits about half of all
violent crime.94 Effective enforcement of the prohibition against felons
possessing firearms offers a useful mechanism for targeting this subset of
offenders.95
C. OPTIONS

If political dynamics change adequately to open the policy window,
policy entrepreneurs should focus on pursuing the forgoing goals while
minimizing the burden these policies place on legitimate gun owners and
licensed dealers. Because over 100 million citizens possess firearms and
because most firearms dealers are small businesses, policies should be
easily understood and easily followed. Any policy that demonizes gun
owners, or any policy advocacy that does so, will generate massive
resistance.
Effective policy faces multiple hurdles. First, it must become
legislation. This means advocates must craft the policy to appeal to a
coalition large enough to constitute a majority in the electorate. Second, it
must not alienate a powerful minority, creating opposition that would
thwart its passage and implementation. Finally, it must be successfully
implemented. As Pressman and Wildavsky clearly demonstrated in their
seminal work on policy implementation, simply instituting a public policy
does not assure the desired result.96 Although successful implementation
depends on executive branch functionaries, legislators can produce policy

POLICY PAPER PRESENTED BY THE NATIONAL POLICY COMMITTEE TO THE AMERICAN SOCIETY
OF
CRIMINOLOGY
(Feb. 2001), available at http://www.asc41.com/policies/
policypaper1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8HC8-WTAK; Understanding the
Incarceration Binge: Author, Robert Perkinson Candidly Discusses Punishment in America,
ACJS NOW (ACJS, Greenbelt, MD), Aug. 2011, at 8–9; HARVARD UNIV. INST. OF POLITICS
MASS INCARCERATION POLICY GROUP, COMMUNICATION OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: A
STRATEGIC OUTREACH P LAN FOR THE NATIONAL INVENTORY OF THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION, (May 2013), available at http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/
default/files_new/research-policy-papers/Mass%20Incarceration%20Policy%20Paper.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/ASM-7HNA.
93
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that either lays the groundwork for implementation or virtually assures that
implementation will fail. To be successful, the policy should focus on clear
objectives, account for the implementation environment, maximize
incentives for compliance, and allow for adaptive change as operators gain
experience. Unfortunately, crafting policy that will pass a legislature may
require none of these.
Several modest, but workable, options exist at the federal level.
Congress could revoke 18 U.S.C. 922(t)(2)(C), the existing prohibition on
retaining information on criminal record checks for gun sales; the restriction
in 18 U.S.C. 926(a) on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF) retaining firearms purchaser information, and 18 U.S.C.
923(g)(3)(B), the restriction on sharing firearms trace information with state
and local police. The firearms lobby would characterize this as a national
registration system; however, it falls far short of that.97 It would eliminate
the need for the arcane system of tracing firearms that now exists.98 It
would also allow ATF to institute a regulation requiring all licensees to
report transfers to other licensees. This would eliminate the potential for
licensed dealers to order guns, fail to enter them in their required log, and
then sell them under the counter with no records and record checks of the
owners. Currently, ATF inspectors have no means of determining if the
dealer has listed all firearms received.
In addition, Congress could reinstate a felony statute for willful
falsification of dealer records. FOPA reduced this offense to a
misdemeanor, even when the dealer fails to record large numbers of guns or
intentionally falsifies his records.99 This change virtually assured that U.S.
Attorneys would not charge this offense.100 Although the majority of
licensed firearms dealers comply with the law, detecting and prosecuting
those who do not presents a significant enforcement problem.101
FOPA also defined “engaging in the firearms business” as requiring
livelihood and profit.102 The nature of this current definition, which allows
traffickers to claim the status of hobbyists and collectors, creates ambiguity

97

True registration, as required by the NFA, criminalizes possession of a firearm not
registered to the possessor and subjects such firearms to seizure.
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See Melissa Block, The Low-Tech Way Guns Get Traced, NPR (May 20, 2013, 5:11
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for enforcers and citizens alike, and frustrates prosecution of illegal
traffickers. A bright line would benefit both persons trying to comply with
the law and those who enforce it. The obvious remedy for this is to set a
number of sales or offers for sale—for example, six per year—that trigger
the need for a license. This would impose a burden on unlicensed
individuals who make a regular habit of buying and selling guns at gun
shows, but that would be the point.
Currently, the law restricts dealers’ licenses to those intending to
engage in the business. Fees are $200 for initial application and $30 per
year for renewal.103 ATF must determine through the totality of
circumstances if the applicant really intends to engage in the business.
Thus, an individual can be denied a license or subsequent license renewal
based on the failure to keep regular business hours at a commercial
premise.104 If ATF fails to renew the license and the individual continues
engaging in gun sales, the agency is placed in the position of charging
someone for dealing without a license after having denied renewal or
issuance of the license. Although such a prosecution may be legally sound
under current law, it seems contradictory to the layman and has been the
source of conflict between ATF and gun rights advocates.105 To remove the
ambiguity, Congress could eliminate the intent-to-engage requirement and
raise the fee to a level that would support the cost of issuing licenses and
conducting yearly inspections. The only rational justification for limiting
dealer licenses to those actively selling firearms is to reduce the total
number of dealers, thus reducing the burden that additional dealers place on
effective regulation and enforcement. If the dealer fees offset the cost of
enforcement, and the applicant otherwise qualifies, this problem ceases to
exist. Higher fees would reduce the number of inactive dealers and those
remaining would offset the cost of overseeing them with their fees.
Requiring private sellers to transfer firearms through licensed dealers,
thus subjecting the purchaser to Brady checks, offers significant potential
for restricting the indiscriminate sale of firearms to strangers at gun shows
and via newspaper or internet ads. The highly public nature of these two
mediums allows for broad enforcement at minimum cost and with
minimum government intrusion into private behavior. This requirement
would likely prove far less effective in controlling occasional sales or
transfers between familiars. Since 1991, California has required the
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transferor of any firearm to do so through a licensed dealer.106 However,
California has devoted few if any resources to informing the public of the
law or enforcing the law, and few residents have complied with the
requirement.107 Jacobs and Potter addressed the problems associated with
enforcing such a requirement in their 1995 critique of Cook, et al.’s analysis
of primary and secondary markets.108 This focus on the mechanics of
implementation, so often absent from policy analysis, raises valid issues.
Establishing an illegal transfer after the fact presents significant
investigative and legal difficulties.109 However, Jacobs and Potter did not
address the utility of such a requirement in constraining sales by unlicensed
dealers. Failure to follow the records check process constitutes a separate
violation from the unlicensed dealing. Undercover purchases would
generate almost insurmountable evidence of a violation. Thus, even
without a revision of the definition of engaging in the business, an effective
mechanism would exist to address unlicensed and indiscriminate trafficking
in firearms, curtail advertisements for sales to strangers, and prevent
indiscriminate sales at gun shows.
Although a requirement to conduct a record check for all private
transfers by routing them through licensed dealers would have limited
impact on casual sales between acquaintances or the use of straw
purchasers, it would constrain a currently unregulated secondary market
that flourishes around gun shows, and progressively the Internet. Jacobs
has appropriately pointed out the fallacy of trying to control only sales at
gun shows, arguing that sellers wishing to avoid the record check
requirement could agree to sell at the gun show and consummate the sale
later.110 This argument reflects some lack of experience with gun shows.
Based on this author’s extensive experience attending gun shows, it seems
likely that many unlicensed sellers sell far too many guns to efficiently
arrange sales for later dates. However, some number would do so.
Requiring all transfers, or all transfers other than those to close relatives and
106

CAL. PENAL CODE § 28050 (West 2012).
Reported sales by dealers outnumber those originating with non-licensed individuals
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108
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CRIMINOLOGY 93 (1995) (critiquing Cook et al.’s analysis).
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temporary transfers for hunting or competition, to go through record
checks, would make selling to strangers far more vulnerable to enforcement
action. Jacobs further makes the point that sales between individuals are
difficult to detect and to prosecute absent some system of required
registration; he is correct on both counts.111 However, Jacobs overlooked
the deterrent effect on repeat sellers.
While law enforcement lacks a mechanism, absent compulsory
registration, for determining that a gun transferred without the proper
process as well as means of proving the facts of the transfer, repeat sellers
are vulnerable to purchases by informants and undercover law enforcement
officers. Unlike drug dealers, gun sellers must constantly seek new
customers. Although some customers will make repeated purchases if guns
are confiscated, lost, stolen, or discarded, guns do not wear out readily. By
dealing with new customers, traffickers put themselves at far greater risk
than dealing with a fixed customer base. In addition, guns are difficult to
hide and discard on short notice, making evidence easier to seize. Any
effort to sell via newspaper or Internet ads without proper transfer puts even
the occasional seller at risk. Thus, Jacobs’s conclusion—that the
requirement for all sales to be conducted through a dealer is
unenforceable—applies only to occasional sales, not to volume trafficking.
D. REGISTRATION AND LICENSING

Enforcing controls on the secondary market and policing individual
transfers to prohibited persons would prove far easier if the United States
had a comprehensive system of licensing and registration for firearms
owners and firearms. In effect, a license would provide a pre-clearance of
the purchaser. The current problem of following up ambiguous dispositions
to arrests and mental commitments before a firearm sale can be approved
would cease, as this action could occur before the issuance of a license.
Such a system would undercut any defense that the transferor of a firearm
did not realize the recipient’s status or the need to conduct the transfer
through a licensed dealer. Even straw purchasers who buy guns for
prohibited persons using their own identification would have to obtain a
permit. Requiring a minimum of training, some sort of competency
examination, and positive identification to obtain a permit would likely
deter many straw purchasers, who can now simply fill out a simple form
and show a driver’s license.112
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Unfortunately, any permit and licensing system faces numerous
practical, political, and legal hurdles. The sheer size of the existing
firearms inventory and the number of gun owners constitute two of the
greatest hurdles. Although the exact number of firearms cannot be
determined, the best estimate is somewhere over 300 million and
growing.113 The number of gun owners proves equally ambiguous, but may
well approach 100 million.114 Any effort to register this many firearms in
the possession of so many individuals presents a formidable task both
practically and politically. Other than the Internal Revenue Service and the
Social Security Administration, the federal government lacks any agency
with the infrastructure and experience to handle such a task, but this
function does not fit with the existing role or culture of either agency. In
addition, both agencies seem stretched to their limit with their current
functions. The task could be simplified if the states took on the primary
responsibility and the federal government provided a central repository of
information. State motor vehicle departments have both the type of
experience and infrastructure that would be required, although not the
resources.
The federal government has succeeded in convincing state legislatures
to insert uniform standards into state law in areas such as auto safety,
drinking age, environmental regulation, and educational testing. However,
recent state resistance to support for universal health care and the
establishment of state exchanges demonstrates a very different political
environment than that of past years. Given the pattern of actions in many
states on concealed carry and efforts by some states to block enforcement of
existing federal firearms laws, cooperation seems highly unlikely in a
majority of states. Any federal effort to mandate state action would face a
constitutional challenge invoking the Printz precedent.
An alternative, advanced in the Gun Violence Prevention Act of 1994,
would impose registration more gradually by registering firearms only at
the time of transfer.115 This approach would leave millions of unregistered
firearms to migrate into the secondary, illegal market and eliminate the
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primary benefit of registration.116 An effective registration system allows
police officers to make an instant determination of the legal status of the
firearm, just as licensing allows instant determination of the legal status of
the possessor. A hybrid system like that advanced in the Gun Violence
Prevention Act undercuts the very justification for either system.
Given the practical, political, and legal barriers that currently exist,
there seems little likelihood of Congress approving any uniform national
system of either firearm registration or firearm owner licensing. The same
conclusion appears probable for the majority of state legislatures.
E. FOCUS ON FELONS

A strategy that has received little attention is to focus on using
firearms laws to incapacitate the highest risk offenders. As previously
cited, research indicates that a subset of active offenders account for over
half the criminal impact.117 This same group self-reported routinely
possessing and carrying firearms.118 This behavior renders this group
vulnerable to the use of firearms statutes. By definition, most are
prohibited persons as a result of felony convictions. Many are subject to
parole and probation searches. Police agencies often target this same group
for focus and attention by career offender units.119 Yet police efforts often
focus on apprehending members of this group during crimes such as
burglary or robbery. In practice, this strategy faces three hurdles. First,
even active offenders engage in criminal conduct for very short periods of
time, necessitating extended covert surveillance by law enforcement.
Second, offenders are at their highest level of alertness immediately before,
during, and after committing offenses, making surveillance most difficult.
Third, apprehension before an offense occurs likely precludes prosecution,
while apprehension during or after creates high risk for police and public.120
Yet to allow an offense to take place puts police at great risk of public
condemnation.
In this author’s experience, police officers have historically often felt
the need to apprehend offenders during or immediately after a primary
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offense has occurred to assure evidence necessary to prosecute the offender.
Apprehending an offender with a firearm at a less risky time has less appeal
to these officers, because the possession of firearms by felons has been
viewed as a less serious “status offense.” Such offenses have historically
often received less investigative and prosecutorial attention because the law
treats them as less serious offenses. Sentencing serves as a proxy for
importance in the world of criminal law.
Operationally, prosecution of serious offenders for firearm possession
offers a number of advantages. The primary witnesses usually consist of
law enforcement officers, who are likely to be more effective witnesses than
the typical victim, and who are more likely to appear in court. A possession
charge offers few defensive strategies when the gun is on the person.121
Although discovery in a home or car resulting from a parole/probation
search or search warrant requires more investigation to substantiate intent
and capacity to possess, suppression of evidence proves difficult in such
scenarios.122
Ironically, during two decades in which sentences for a variety of
crime, particularly those involving narcotics and sexual assaults, were
widely increased, legislatures have largely ignored firearm possession
offenses. Congress did, however, institute mandatory sentences for felons
in possession who had three prior violent crimes or serious drug offenses.123
Only California included felon in possession in its career offender law.124
Elevation of the sentencing potential for felons possessing firearms would
have to overcome the current reaction over sentencing of minor drug
offenders and other mandatory sentencing that has expanded prison
populations and has generated negative reaction from scholars, the legal
profession and, most recently, the public. The most visible example of the
reaction to this overreach is evident in the successful passage of Proposition
36, which greatly reduced the number of offenses constituting a third strike
under California law. 125
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Longer sentencing of repeat felons with firearms differs from
California’s three strikes mandatory twenty-five years to life sentence for
any felony126 or the disproportionate federal sentences for crack cocaine.127
Both of these grew out of moral panics that generated political responses.
Unlike the crack cocaine sentences, this approach would not apply to young
persons with little or no criminal history. Unlike the original California
approach, it would not target low risk, chronic offenders. Active offenders,
who make a practice of carrying firearms, constitute a very high-risk
population. Choosing to attain a firearm illegally constitutes a conscious,
planned offense. Even the decision to carry a firearm often involves more
opportunity for thoughtful reflection than the decision to use the firearm.
The combination of persons with a predilection for violence and firearms is
very dangerous.
Although increasing the likelihood of incarceration for firearms
possession by persons with prior violent felony convictions would not face
the entrenched opposition of conservatives and the gun lobby, it will likely
face opposition from some liberals and scholars who will see it as just
another effort to utilize incarceration as the sole response to crime.
Reducing this opposition would require convincing elites, particularly
attorneys and social scientists, that this is a limited effort directed only at
those offenders who pose the greatest risk and are the least amenable to
rehabilitation and not a new push for massive incarceration.
F. POLICY CHANGES UNLIKELY

Long-term demographic trends do seem to foretell a slow decline in
American gun culture, with both hunting and gun ownership reflecting this
trend.128 Although this would seem to imply an improving environment for
additional gun control, significant policy change in the area of gun
regulation seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. The current state of
national politics constitutes the greatest immediate bar to legislation.
Beyond that, the entrenched power of gun control opponents, combined
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with the practical problems of designing a workable regulatory policy that
can be implemented for such a large gun-owning population with over 300
million guns, constitute long-term barriers that will not dissolve readily,
even if the political environment becomes less acrimonious and more
cooperative.
In the near and intermediate term, decentralized efforts directed at
reducing gun carrying and violent behavior among at-risk populations seem
to offer the most potential for reducing gun violence. Two important facts
regarding homicide should inform policy: many homicides are spontaneous
actions facilitated by the presence of firearms, and second, these homicides
are concentrated culturally and geographically.129 As Malcolm Gladwell
has so convincingly argued, social change does not follow a linear
trajectory, but spreads like an epidemic.130 Changing a few critical actors
holds the key to initiating the spread of a social norm and social behavior.
Interventions that change norms relating to gun carrying and acceptance of
violence as normal behavior among high-risk populations offer significant
potential for reducing death and serious injury from firearms. Ceasefire
projects would seem to offer more near-term hope for reducing violence
than does the frustrated pursuit of new national gun laws.131
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